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STANDING PAT IN A POST-KELO WORLD: 
PRESERVATION OF BROAD EMINENT 
DOMAIN POWER IN KAUR V. NEW YORK 
STATE DEVELOPMENT CORP. 
Abstract: On June 24, 2010, the New York Court of Appeals in Kaur v. 
New York State Urban Development Corp. upheld a state taking of private 
property to expand Columbia University’s campus into the Manhattan-
ville neighborhood of New York City. In doing so, the court reaffirmed 
precedent holding that the determinations of state agencies vested with 
the condemnation power are entitled to substantial judicial deference. 
This deferential posture assumed by the Court of Appeals helps preserve 
a broad power of eminent domain in New York. 
Introduction 
 The right of property has been called “the guardian of every other 
right.”1 It is not, however, an absolute right—property has always been 
subject to reasonable statutory and judge-made regulations.2 The con-
sequent tension between state power and individual rights is particu-
larly evident in cases of eminent domain, or the right of a government, 
through the formal process of condemnation, to seize private property 
without consent.3 
 The Takings Clause, part of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution, limits the exercise of eminent domain through the “public 
use” requirement, which mandates that any government taking serve a 
public purpose.4 To illustrate, it would be unconstitutional for the fed-
eral government to take private property from A and transfer it to B for 
the sole private benefit of B.5 Disputes involving eminent domain, how-
                                                                                                                      
1 James W. Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right 26 (3d ed. 2008) (citing Ar-
thur Lee, American revolutionary and diplomat). 
2 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Dis-
course 18–20 (1991). 
3 See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
4 U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted “public use” broadly to 
mean public purpose, such that condemned property must be put to use for public benefit 
but need not be accessible for actual use or occupation by the general public. See Kelo, 545 
U.S. at 479–80. 
5 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. 
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ever, are often not so clear-cut.6 For instance, what if B is a private party 
but promises to develop the land in a manner that yields substantial 
public benefit?7 
 This was the question that confronted the U.S. Supreme Court in 
2005 in Kelo v. City of New London.8 The state was attempting to seize 
private property through eminent domain, and then turn it over to 
other private parties for commercial development.9 The Court upheld 
the taking in a contentious 5–4 decision, reasoning that economic de-
velopment by private parties could be a valid public use within the 
meaning of the Takings Clause.10 
aur II ).16 
                                                                                                                     
 In response to Kelo and the public outcry it provoked, many state 
legislatures sought to limit eminent domain.11 By June 2008, thirty-seven 
states had enacted some form of legislation curtailing its exercise.12 New 
York, however, was not one of them.13 Although the movement to rein 
in eminent domain found no traction in the state legislature, it persisted 
in the state courts in the form of petitions challenging state condemna-
tions of property.14 In 2009, Kaur v. New York State Urban Development 
Corp. (Kaur I ) came to the First Department of the New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, presenting many of the same issues at contro-
versy in Kelo.15 Although the Appellate Division took the opportunity to 
curtail the state’s power of eminent domain in Kaur I, it was ultimately 
reversed by the Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court, in the 2010 
case Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp. (K
 Part I of this Comment provides a brief legal history of eminent 
domain in New York—with a specific focus on condemnations for blight 
 
6 See generally id. 
7 See generally id. 
8 See id. at 472. 
9 See id. at 473–75. 
10 See id. at 490. 
11 Edward J. Lopez et al., Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo 
Backlash, 5 Rev. L. & Econ. 101, 102 (2009). 
12 See id. at 101–02. For example, ballot initiatives proposing limitations on regulatory 
takings appeared in Washington, Idaho, California, and Arizona, where voters passed 
Proposition 207 or the “Private Property Rights Protection Act.” See Rebecca L. Puskas, 
Note, Measure 37’s Federal Law Exception: A Critical Protection for Oregon’s Federally Approved 
Land Use Laws, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1301, 1310 (2007). 
13 See Lopez et al., supra note 11, at 101–02. 
14 See generally Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009); 
Develop Don’t Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urban Dev. Corp., 874 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div. 2009). 
15 See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. (Kaur I ), 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 16–20 (App. Div. 
2009) (comparing the facts of the case to those of Kelo), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010). 
16 See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. (Kaur II ), 933 N.E.2d 721, 737 (N.Y. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
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removal and civic projects—to contextualize the decisions reached in 
Kaur I and Kaur II.17 Part II examines how the two courts reached their 
respective decisions, with a particular emphasis on the standards of re-
view employed and the degree of deference accorded to agency deter-
minations.18 Finally, Part III argues that the standards for review and 
deference that won out—those employed by the Court of Appeals— 
help to preserve the tradition of broad eminent domain power in New 
York by limiting the judiciary’s power to invalidate state condemna-
tions.19 
I. Eminent Domain in New York: A Brief Legal History 
 The takings clause of the New York state constitution, like that of 
the U.S. Constitution, includes a public use requirement that requires 
state takings of private property to serve a public purpose.20 In 1936, in 
New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, the Court of Appeals held that 
removal of blight constitutes a public purpose.21 The U.S. Supreme 
Court reiterated as much in 1954 in Berman v. Parker, holding that 
blight removal, slum clearance, and redevelopment could permissibly 
trigger eminent domain.22 It has since become a well-established prin-
ciple in New York case law that blight removal is a public use within the 
meaning of the state takings clause, and therefore a valid predicate for 
the exercise of eminent domain.23 
 Moreover, the state constitution expressly empowers the legislature 
to provide for the “clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabili-
tation” of blighted areas.24 Accordingly, the state legislature in 1968 
passed the New York State Urban Development Corporation Act (the 
“UDC Act”), which created and vested with eminent domain power a 
quasi-legislative public authority known as the Empire State Develop-
ment Corporation (“ESDC”).25 
 Under the UDC Act, ESDC can authorize condemnation for a lim-
ited number of public use purposes, among them land use improve-
                                                                                                                      
17 See infra notes 20–46 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 47–81 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 82–93 and accompanying text. 
20 N.Y. Const. art. I, § 7(a) (“Private property shall not be taken for public use without 
just compensation.”). 
21 See 1 N.E.2d 152, 155 (N.Y. 1936). 
22 See 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954). 
23 See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 879 N.Y.S.2d 524, 533–34 (App. Div. 
2009), aff’d, 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
24 N.Y. Const. art. XVIII, § 1. 
25 N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 6254(1), 6255(7) (McKinney 2010). 
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ment projects and civic projects.26 A land use improvement project is 
an undertaking to ameliorate blight through the “clearance, replan-
ning, reconstruction, and rehabilitation . . . of a substandard and in-
sanitary area.”27 A civic project is “[a] project . . . designed and in-
tended for the purpose of providing facilities for educational, cultural, 
recreational, community, municipal, public service or other civic pur-
ose
ic project, and can this benefit spring from a private party or en-
ty?
re thus con-
ne
                                                                                                                     
p s.”28 
 Challenges to ESDC’s use of condemnation for land use improve-
ment projects have typically presented two questions for the courts: 
What constitutes blight, and how extensive must it be before the state 
can use condemnation to ameliorate it?29 ESDC’s use of condemnation 
in connection with civic projects has likewise raised two primary ques-
tions: How much public benefit must an undertaking provide to qualify 
as a civ
ti 30 
 With regard to identifying blight, New York courts have tradition-
ally deferred to quasi-legislative agencies like ESDC, which have been 
empowered by the legislature to make objective blight determina-
tions.31 In 2009, in Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp., the 
Court of Appeals clarified this limited standard of review: “It is only 
where there is no room for reasonable difference of opinion as to 
whether an area is blighted, that judges may substitute their views . . . 
for those of the legislatively designated agencies.”32 Court a
fi d to a rational basis review of ESDC’s determinations.33 
 New York courts have accorded ESDC similar deference to qualify 
its condemnation undertakings as civic projects.34 For example, in 
2009, in Develop Don’t Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urban Development Corp., the 
Appellate Division determined that construction of a privately owned 
 
26 Id. §§ 6253(6), 6255(9). 
27 Id. § 6253(6)(c). 
28 Id. § 6253(6)(d). 
29 See, e.g., Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. (Kaur I ), 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 20–23 (App. Div. 
2009) (scrutinizing the findings of a study ESDC relied upon for its blight designation). 
30 See id. at 23–25 (casting doubt upon the putative public benefit of a project, espe-
cially given the private nature of the entity providing the benefit). 
31 See Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 662 (N.Y. 1953) (“[T]he Legislature has 
authorized the city officials . . . to make a [blight] determination, and so the making 
thereof is simply an act of government, . . . legislative in fundamental character, which, 
whether wise or unwise, cannot be overhauled by the courts.”). 
32 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. 2009). 
33 See id. 
34 See, e.g., Develop Don’t Destroy (Brooklyn) v. Urban Dev. Corp., 874 N.Y.S.2d 414, 
424 (App. Div. 2009). 
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basketball arena qualified as a civic project because ESDC’s determina-
tion that it would provide recreational and entertainment benefits to 
the public was not irrational.35 The court also held that a private entity 
 
ear
 con-
em
                                                                                                                     
can provide the public benefit requisite for a civic project.36 
 These principles of eminent domain jurisprudence were again 
questioned in 2009 when Kaur I came to New York’s Appellate Divi-
sion.37 Brothers Parminder and Amanjit Kaur challenged the proposed 
condemnation of seventeen acres in the Manhattanville neighborhood 
of West Harlem (the “Project”).38 ESDC had ordered the condemna-
tion, which called for acquisition of a gas station owned by the Kaurs, to
cl  the way for nearby Columbia University to build a new campus.39 
 In fact, Columbia had been eyeing expansion into Manhattanville 
since at least 2002, when it began privately buying up property so ag-
gressively that within six years it owned or had contracted to purchase 
forty-eight of sixty-seven lots in the Project area.40 The Kaurs were 
among the few holdouts.41 Their refusal was rendered moot, however, 
when ESDC declared the Project area blighted based on two studies it 
had commissioned, enabling it to condemn the property as part of a 
land use improvement project.42 ESDC also justified the condemnation 
as a civic project, citing numerous public benefits Columbia’s expan-
sion would provide.43 The Kaurs’ only hope was to challenge the
d nation under New York’s Eminent Domain Procedure Law. 44 
 In a move that cut against the recent trend of New York decisions 
upholding state takings, most notably Goldstein, the court invalidated 
ESDC’s planned condemnation, ruling it unconstitutional on four 
grounds: (1) the taking was not for public use because it did not qualify 
as a land use improvement project; (2) the UDC Act, if not unconstitu-
tionally vague, was at least unconstitutional as applied by ESDC; (3) the 
taking was not for public use because it did not qualify as a civic project; 
and (4) ESDC’s premature closure of the administrative record violated 
the petitioners’ right to due process.45 The petitioners’ victory was 
 
35 See id. 
36 See id. at 424. 
37 See 892 N.Y.S.2d at 20–26. 
38 See id. at 15. 
39 See id. at 11–12, 15. 
40 See id. at 13. 
41 See id. at 15. 
42 See id. at 14–15. 
43 See Kaur I, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 14–15. 
44 N.Y. Em. Dom. Proc. Law § 207(A) (McKinney 2010). 
45 See Kaur I, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 20–27. 
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short-lived, however: less than seven months later the Court of Appeals 
unanimously reversed in Kaur II, upholding the condemnation and 
clearing the way for Columbia’s expansion.46 
II. Rational Basis by the New York  
ying the condemna-
tion and Columbia’s expansion as a civic project.47 
onal basis, given the two separate blight studies relied upon by 
      
 Review as Applied 
Court of Appeals 
 In Kaur II, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division on 
all four grounds, three of which warrant further discussion in this 
Comment: (1) there was a rational basis for ESDC’s determination that 
the project area suffered from blight, removal of which qualified as a 
land use improvement project under the UDC Act; (2) the UDC Act 
was neither unconstitutionally vague nor unconstitutional as applied by 
ESDC; and (3) ESDC had a rational basis for qualif
A. There Was a Rational Basis for ESDC’s Blight Determination 
 The Court of Appeals held that the lower court, in rejecting 
ESDC’s blight determination, did not properly apply the rational basis 
test articulated in Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp.48 
Under this standard, the court explained, the only question for the ju-
diciary was whether ESDC had a rational basis in concluding that the 
Project area was blighted.49 The Court of Appeals concluded that there 
was a rati
ESDC.50 
 The Kaur I court had acknowledged these two studies, but never-
theless ruled that ESDC had failed to provide credible and sufficiently 
independent proof of blight in Manhattanville.51 The court was refer-
ring to the fact that Allee, King, Rosen and Fleming, Inc. (“AKRF”), the 
firm ESDC commissioned in 2006 to conduct the first blight study, had 
been helping Columbia develop a plan for expansion into Manhattan-
ville since at least 2004.52 Columbia even indirectly funded the AKRF 
                                                                                                                
 State Urban Dev. Corp. (Kaur II ), 933 N.E.2d 721, 730–37 (N.Y. 2010). 
0. 
Urban Dev. Corp. (Kaur I ), 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 20–22 (App. Div. 2009). 
1–22. 
46 See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. (Kaur II ), 933 N.E.2d 721, 737 (N.Y. 2010). 
47 See Kaur v. N.Y.
48 See id. at 731. 
49 See id. at 73
50 Id. at 731. 
51 Kaur v. N.Y. State 
52 Id. at 12, 2
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st y, since it had agreed to cover all of ESDC’s costs in connection 
with the Project.
ud
r in Manhattanville.57 This 
ise
t collusion may have been valid, the two blight 
studies presented sufficient evidence that ESDC’s blight determination 
was rationally
                                                                                                                     
53 
 According to the lower court, this presented an obvious conflict of 
interest that predisposed AKRF to a finding of blight, arrived at 
through a “methodology biased in Columbia’s favor.”54 Also of signifi-
cance to the lower court was the fact that by the time AKRF issued the 
results of its study in 2007, Columbia owned seventy-two percent of the 
lots in Manhattanville.55 Whereas AKRF’s study found that forty-eight of 
the sixty-seven lots in this area exhibited “substandard condition[s],” an 
earlier 2002 study conducted by Ernst & Young had concluded that fif-
ty-four of the same sixty-seven lots were in “fair,” “good,” or “very good” 
condition.56 Thus, even if AKRF’s blight findings were accurate, much 
of the deterioration giving rise to blight potentially occurred while Co-
lumbia was the majority property owne
ra d the possibility that Columbia intentionally allowed property to 
deteriorate to make condemnation more likely.58 
 For the lower court, this possibility betrayed a concerted, collusive 
effort on the part of ESDC and Columbia to manufacture a blight find-
ing.59 Although intensive scrutiny of the factual record led the lower 
court to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals in Kaur II determined 
that such scrutiny constituted an improper de novo review of the re-
cord.60 The Court of Appeals further held that, although the lower 
court’s concerns abou
 based.61 
 
h Inc., because it duplicated much of the methodology used in AKRF’s 
stud
e Project area and al-
lowe  problems to go unaddressed). 
, which was not enough under the 
Gold rturn ESDC’s determination). 
53 Id. at 12. 
54 Id. at 21–22. The court also rejected the credibility of a second study by a different 
firm, Earth Tec
y. Id. at 22. 
55 See id. at 13. 
56 Id. at 12–13. 
57 Kaur I, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
58 See id. (noting that Columbia forced out tenant businesses in th
d water infiltration
59 See id. at 21–22. 
60 See Kaur II, 933 N.E. 2d at 731. 
61 See id. (noting that the lower court’s review merely established a difference of opin-
ion as to whether the Project area was blighted or not
stein standard to ove
264 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
B. The UDCA Was Not Unconstitutionally Vague 
 The Court of Appeals next held that even though the UDC Act 
lacked clear standards for what constituted blight, it was not unconstitu-
tionally vague.62 The court relied heavily on the proposition that blight 
is dependent on a number of variable factors and therefore “must be 
63viewed on a case-by-case basis.”  The court also relied on the 1954 U.S. 
Supreme Court case Berman v. Parker, in which the Court noted that 
blight is an elastic concept that does not call for an inflexible defini-
tion.64 Accordingly, the UDC Act provided enough meaning to the term 
“substandard or insanitary area” for it to pass constitutional muster.65 
 Oddly, the Kaur I court never explicitly declared the statutory lan-
guage of the UDC Act unconstitutionally vague.66 Rather, the court had 
held the UDC Act unconstitutional as applied because its lack of stan-
dards necessarily granted ESDC too much discretion in determining 
what constituted blight.67 The lower court pointed in particular to a 
previous study of the Atlantic Yards area of Brooklyn, in which AKRF 
had designated buildings at least fifty percent vacant as indicative of 
blight.68 Yet AKRF’s Manhattanville study designated buildings only 
twenty-five percent vacant as indicative of blight.69 The lower court was 
also highly skeptical of ESDC’s reliance on underutilization as an indi-
cator of blight.70 
 This argument failed to persuade the Court of Appeals, however, 
which maintained in Kaur II that ESDC had relied on more than just 
underutilization to support its blight determination.71 The court en-
dorsed ESDC’s determination as a thorough evaluation of the project 
site based on a host of factors, including “the physical, economic, engi-
neering and environmental conditions at the Project site.”72 Further-
more, the fact that ESDC’s standards diverged from those used by other 
                                                                                                                      
t 732–33. 
(noting that a “wide variety of values” can be taken in-
to a
at 732–33. 
Y.S.2d at 25. 
t 25. 
built up to nearly the max-
imu y the local zoning regulations. Id. 
731. 
62 See id. a
63 See id. 
64 See 348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954) 
ccount when evaluating blight). 
65 See Kaur II, 933 N.E.2d 
66 See 892 N.
67 Id. at 26. 
68 Id. a
69 Id. 
70 See id. at 22–23. AKRF designated buildings as underutilized—and therefore indica-
tive of blight regardless of physical condition—if they were not 
m floor space allowable b
71 See 933 N.E.2d at 
72 Id. 
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agen titu-
74 The court relied heavily on 
court in Kaur II asserted 
that Columbia’s expansion would produce a bevy of cognizable public 
benefits, tion of 
b g
                                                                                                                     
cies or in previous studies did not render the UDC Act uncons
tional as applied, since it was not necessary that “the degree of deterio-
ration or precise percentage of obsolescence . . . be arrived at with pre-
cision.”73 
C. There Was a Rational Basis for ESDC’s Civic Project Designation 
 Finally, the Kaur II court held that ESDC had a rational basis for 
determining that a sufficient public benefit would flow from Colum-
bia’s expansion to deem it a civic project.
the language of the UDC Act, which explicitly defined a civic project as 
one intended to provide “facilities for educational, cultural, recrea-
tional, community, municipal, public service or other civic purposes.”75 
As a university, Columbia was clearly a provider of “educational” ser-
vices within the meaning of the statute.76 
 The Kaur I court had acknowledged that Columbia’s new campus 
would provide educational services, but interpreted the statute to re-
quire even those services to have a civic purpose.77 That was the not the 
case with Columbia, the court reasoned, because the university’s private 
nature rendered it “virtually the sole beneficiary of the Project.”78 
 The Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the Project was not 
disqualified from being a civic project just because a private party bene-
fitted; the UDC Act, after all, explicitly permitted private involvement 
in redevelopment projects.79 Moreover, the 
 such as education and expansion of knowledge, stimula
jo rowth, and valuable scientific research.80 The court held that the 
anticipation of such benefits provided a rational basis for ESDC to qual-
ify Columbia’s expansion as a civic project.81 
III. Rational Basis Review in Practice: A Low Bar 
 Kaur II preserved broad eminent domain power in New York by 
signaling that agencies like ESDC have broad discretion to justify con-
 
 (McKinney 2010). 
at 733–34. 
Y.S.2d at 23. 
 (McKinney 2010); Kaur II, 933 N.E.2d at 733. 
E.2d at 734–35. 
73 Id. at 732. 
74 Id. at 733–35. 
75 N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 6253(6)(d)
76 See Kaur II, 933 N.E.2d 
77 See 892 N.
78 Id. at 24. 
79 See N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 6252
80 Kaur II, 933 N.
81 Id. at 733–35. 
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demnations as blight removal projects or civic projects, and the Court 
of Appeals will not step in to invalidate the taking unless the agency’s 
justification was completely irrational and baseless.82 The differing re-
sults in Kaur II and Kaur I are explained the different standards of def-
erence employed: the Court of Appeals in Kaur II held that ESDC’s 
proposed condemnation was constitutional not because it definitively 
constituted a land use improvement project and civic project, but be-
cause ESDC had a rational basis for qualifying it as such.83 This highly 
efe
ctual re-
rd
fficient to prove 
ad 
II court set the bar for upholding ESDC’s determinations correspond-
                                                                                                     
d rential stance contrasted sharply with Kaur I’s more assertive pos-
ture, which was all the more striking given that it occurred just ten days 
after the Court of Appeals had reaffirmed the rational basis standard of 
review for agency determinations in Goldstein v. New York State Urban De-
velopment Corp.84 
 Even though the Kaur I court never explicitly conducted a rational 
basis test, it arguably did so implicitly when it scrutinized the fa
co  and concluded that ESDC’s blight determination was “mere soph-
istry.”85 Through even minimal scrutiny, the court discovered that the 
studies relied on by ESDC were potentially colored by bias and suspect 
methodology, while the history between ESDC and Columbia raised the 
possibility that the condemnation was a product of collusion.86 
 Although it acknowledged that corruption and bad faith could be 
relevant in a rational basis review, the Court of Appeals summarily dis-
missed the concerns of the lower court as utterly insu
b faith or the irrationality of ESDC’s determinations.87 The Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Kaur II therefore set the bar for proving bad faith 
very high in New York: it clearly requires more than the questionable 
pattern of behavior identified by the lower court, and probably even 
requires clear evidence of a specific act of bad faith.88 
 After setting the bar for proving bad faith extremely high, the Kaur 
                 
p. (Kaur I ), 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 16 (App. 
Div.
.S.2d at 16 (positing that courts must make an independent de-
term  of a condemnation); see also Goldstein v. N.Y. State 
Urb .E.2d 164, 174 (N.Y. 2009). 
aur II, 933 N.E.2d at 732. 
 
82 See infra notes 83–93 and accompanying text. 
83 Compare Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. (Kaur II ), 933 N.E.2d 721, 731, 737 
(N.Y. 2010), with Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Cor
 2009). 
84 See Kaur I, 892 N.Y
ination as to the public purpose
an Dev. Corp., 921 N
85 See Kaur I, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 16. 
86 See id. at 21–23. 
87 See K
88 See id. at 731–32.
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umption of validity and the scope of 
public benefits recognized by the Court of Appeals is, in practice, quite 
broad.92 It appears that as l ather modest requirements 
udiciary. The result is a state of emi-
nent domain in New York much the same today as it 
road power, entrusted to the discretion of quasi-le
at does not require independent judicial sanction and is subject only 
 
Preferred citation: Matthew Pickel, Comment, Standing Pat in a Post-Kelo World: Preservation of 
Broad Eminent Domain Power in Kaur v. New York State Development Corp., 52 B.C. L. Rev. E. 
Supp. 257 (2011), http://www.bc.edu/bclr/esupp_2011/20_pickel.pdf. 
                                                                                                                     
ingly low.89 To show blight, ESDC merely must produce a study that 
identifies and measures specific indicia of blight through objective 
methods, which the court will not rigorously question.90 Similarly, to 
show a civic project, ESDC must show that the public will derive some 
cognizable benefit from the project.91 This does not represent a signifi-
cant burden, as ESDC’s determination that the condemnation will 
serve a civic purpose creates a pres
ong as these r
are met, the courts will be unwilling to step in and overturn ESDC’s 
blight or civic project determinations.93 
Conclusion 
 The Appellate Division in Kaur I proposed that the judiciary must 
make an independent determination that a state taking has a public 
purpose. The Court of Appeals in Kaur II rejected this notion, noting 
that eminent domain is primarily a question for the legislature and calls 
for broad judicial deference to agency determinations. After Kelo, many 
states moved quickly to restrict the exercise of eminent domain, but the 
New York legislature stood pat—a move the Court of Appeals arguably 
regarded as a legislative mandate that eminent domain was not to be 
independently reined in by the j
was before Kelo : a 
gislative agencies, b
th
to a lenient rational basis review. 
Matthew Pickel 
 
 
89 See id. at 730–31 (holding that the court can only step in to invalidate an agency-
made blight determination if there is no room for disagreement that it is irrational or 
corrupt). 
90 See id. at 731. 
91 See id. at 733–35. 
92 See id. (recognizing, for example, that economic effects like stimulation of job growth 
can constitute a public benefit, even if those effects flow somewhat indirectly from a private 
endeavor). 
93 See Kaur II, 933 N.E.2d at 730–31, 733–35. 
